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IN THE SUPREME CUURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

CASE NO. 16585

vs
RICHARD LYNN CARLSON,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

Appellant was convicted of two counts of possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute for value, in
vi o 1at i on of U. C . A. 5 8 -3 7 -8 ( 1 ) ( a ) ( i i ) (Te t rah yd r a can nab i no 1 ) •

DI SPOS IT ION IN THE LOWER CUURT

The Honorable Peter F. Leary, sitting without a jury, found
Appellant guilty of two counts of possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute for value.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Appellant seeks reversal of the convictions.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On or about August 31, 1978, a team composed of University
of Utah police officers, and officers from Salt Lake City and
Salt Lake County, executed a search warrant at 5134 Jolley
Street, in Salt Lake County, Utah.

There they found the

Appellant, Richard Lynn Carlson, and his wife, Margaret Carlson.
The search yielded various items from the house,

including

two pistols (State's Exhibits 2 and 3), five bags, containing
marijuana (State's exhibit 18), and an aerosal can with a false
bottom, containing six (6) bags of a substance later determined
to be heroin (State's Exhibit 6).
of the evidence list

Also received were two copies

made at the scene (Defendant's Exhibits 19

and 26).
The case was tried without a jury before the Honorable Peter
F. Leary.

All witnesses were sworn, and the exclusionary rule

was invoked as to the witnesses (T. 5, 6).
officers began testifying,

As the police

it became apparent that there were

problems in the establistunent of the chain of evidence of certain
it

s found in the home.
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After the noon recsss, onthe first day of trial, counsel for
the Appellant brought to the Court's attention the fact that
counsel for the State, Jerry Campbell, was overheard discussing
the case with several officers.

The Appellant was sworn and

testified that he overheard counsel for the State remark to the
witnesses, "We've got to establish a chain!"
When one of the Witnesses asked, "How do we do that?", !\Ir.
Campbell was said to have replied, "Just do it!"

{T. 85)

Jerry

Campbell was sworn and admitted that he had a conversation with
several of the officers together {T. 90).
discussed (T. 90.)

The chain problem was

Based upon this testimony, defense counsel

made a motion to limit any further testimony from the officers
involved.

The Court admitted the evidence subject to a motion to

strike at a later time, noting that the facts showed a clear
violation of the Exclusionary Rule {T. 91.).
The remainder of the trial consisted of admitting some of
the items seized in the search of the home for the State's
evidence.

Deputy Michael George testified that, in his opinion,

the amount of narcotics found would indicate

they were held for

sale rather than for personal use {T. 37, Vol 2.).
At the end of the State's case, defense counsel made a
motion to dismiss as to Margaret Carlson

which motion was taken

under advisement by the Court.
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Margaret Carlson testified that she knew of no narcotics in
the house except for a small amount of marijuana which her
husband kept for his personal use (T. 99, Vol. 2)
Bill Jenkins was called and after being admonished about his
right against self-incrimination, as provided by the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution (T. 129-135, 160),
testified that he was a user of heroin and that he had left an
aerosol can, containing heroin,

in Appellant's residence

approximately one (l)hour before the search warrant (T 163, Vol.
2) was executed ..

He testified further that no one knew of the

contents of the container (T. 164, Vol. 2).
John Peterson and Lynn Williams were called, and testified
to being former heroin addicts familiar with drug use.

They

testified to the fact that the amount of narcotics found in the
Carlson home would not be an unusual amount for personal use.
The defense rested, and the Court granted defense counsel's
motion to dismiss, as to Margaret Carlson.

Defense counsel

renewed his motion to strike the testimony with respect to the
"chain testimony", based upon the violation of the Exclusionary
Rule.

The Court took the matter under advisement, and later

denied the motion.

Appellant was found guilty of two counts of

possession of a controlled substance, with intent to distribute
for value, from which verdict he now appeals.
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ARGUMENT

POINT I

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN
DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION
TO STRIKE TESTII\10NY WHICH
WAS TAINTED BY A CLEAR VIOLATION
OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE.

In the case before the Court, the Appellant was convicted of
two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute for value,
1953, as amended.

in violation of U.C.A. 58-37-S(l)(a)(ii),

Amounts of marijuana and heroin were found at

Appellant's residence pursuant to a search warrant.
At the beginning of the trial, which was conducted without a
jury, counsel for Appellant moved that the Exclusionary Rule, as
to witnesses, be invoked, which motion was granted (T. 5, 6).
All potential witnesses for the state were sworn and properly
admonished.

l\luch of the trial consisted of the introduction of

evidence consisting of items taken from Appellant's residence
pursuant to the search warrant.

During the first morning of

trial, it became apparent that there were certain problems with
the chain of custody of some critical items of evidence.

Defense
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counsel made numerous objections on that basis, which were
sustained by the trial judge.

(T. 53, 63).

After the noon recess, defense counsel called the qppellant
to the stand to testify as to a conversation he overheard between
the prosecutor and the police officers.

(T. 84-86)

Counsel for

the State, Jerry Campbell, was sworn and admitted to a
conversation between himself and the officers who served as
evidence custodians in the search.

He also admitted that the

chain of evidence problem was discussed.

(T. 90).

Defense

counsel moved to limit further testimony by the officers involved
(T. 91).

The Court permitted the evidence to continue, subject

to a motion to strike, which motion was later made and denied.
The Court ruled that the Exclusionary Rule had been
violated.

Judge Leary stated:

ttBut as I recall, the ordinary circumstances would
be that you certainly might discuss individually
with the witnesses what their testimony might be, or
any matter in connection with .... but when you have
two of them together, it certainly is a violation of
the Rule in regard to exclusion of witnesses, and
that's clear.tt (T. 91, 92).
When the Exclusionary Rule is blatantly and clearly
violated, as it was in this case, the law is clear.

In State v.
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~ 564, P.

2d, 312 (Utah 1977), this Court encountered a

similar situation.

The prosecutor discussed the case with

several witnesses in a group.

When the violation was brought to

the Court's attention, defense counsel made a motion for a
mistrial.

The motion was denied, and this Court affirmed that

decision (See, State v. Dodge, supra, at 313).

The basis of the

Court's ruling in Dodge was that 1) a less drastic corrective
measure was available to counsel; and 2) no prejudice to
Appellant was shown. The Court stated:
"The trial court had other alternatives to the
mistrial the Appellant requested.

A motion to strike

or exclude the violating witnesses' testimony could
have been made. State v. Dodge,

~at

313.

Counsel for Appellant availed himself of these options as
suggested by this Court.

The motions were denied.

Continued

testimony as to the chain was heard and allowed to stand.

And,

not surprisingly, the disputed items of evidence were later
linked up in the chain and admitted (See the List of Exhibits
contained in the record herein.)
That the Exclusionary Rule was violated is undisputed, and
the lower c0urt so ruled (T. 91).

Counsel for defense made the

proper motions, as suggested by this Court.

That appellant was

prejudiced is also clear from the fact that the chain problems
evidenced in the morning session were later "cured".
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As to the issue of prejudice, Appellant draws the Court's
attention to what was said by Justice Maughn in dissenting in the
Dodge case:
"Where a discussion of the evidence to be put before
the Court constitutes a violation of the rule,
intrinsic to that violation is prejudice."
Dodge, supra, at 313

State v.

Emphasis Added.

The prejudice is all the more serious where the evidence
against the accused is wholly circumstantial.

In the case before

the Court, the only evidence was that controlled substances were
found on the premises. No evidence linked appellant to the
evidence or showed that he exercised dominion or control over the
items.

Again, quoting Justice Maughn:

"Here it would appear the evidence which was used to
convict was tainted by violation of the rule.

In

addition, there was no direct evidence - it was all
circumstantial. In this kind of situation, I would
conclude the matter should be reversed and remanded
for a new trial.

State v. Dodge,

supra, at 314.

Lest the Exclusionary Rule be rendered a nullity, with no
method of enforcement, this Court should hold that the lower
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court erred in not striking the testimony tainted by violation of
the Rule, and reverse the conviction.

POINT II

THE EVIDENCE IN THE LOWER COURT
WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE CONVICTIONS

It is axiomatic that, in a criminal prosecution, the State
must prove each and every element beyond a reaonsable doubt.

The

information charged Appellant wih two counts of possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute for value, U.C.A.
58-37-B(l)(a (ii), 1953, as amended.

It was therefore incumbent

upon the State to prove: 1) that the Appellant possessed a
substance; 2) that the substance was a controlled substance as
defined by statute and 3) that he had the intent to distribute it
for value.
There is no dispute that controlled substances were found on
the premises.

However, that was all that the State proved.

The

only evidence was that some marijuana and heroin were found at
the residence (State's Exhibits, 18P and 6P, respectively.)

The

residence was occupied jointly by the Appellant, his wife, and
five children.

Most of the evidence seized was in the northwest

bedroom, where Appellant and his wife slept.

There is no
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evidence in the record which would tend to show that appellant
"possessed" the substances.

Possession has been defined as "having control over a place
or thing with knowledge of and intent to have such control".
State v. Faulkner.

220 Kan. 153, 551 P. 2d 1247 (1976).

Jn

other words to prove possession, the State must prove that a
person exercises dominion or control over an item.

That proof is

totally lacking here.
Mere presence of an accused at a place where a narcotic
drug is found is insufficient to show knowledge of the drug's
pre sen c e ( S tat e v . Mos 1 e y , 1 1 9 Ar i z . 3 9 3 , 5 8 1 P . 2 d 2 3 8
Sullateskee v. State, 428 P. 2d, 736,

(Okla., 1967).

(1

9 78 ) ;

It should

be noted that the Appellant's wife, another occupant in the home,
was also charged in this case with the same crime.

A motion to

dismiss as to the charges against her was granted by the Court
(T. 218, Vol. 2).

Yet there appears no evidence to show that

apoellant should be treated any differently on the issue of
dominion of control than his wife.

In fact, as regards the

he r o i n , B i 1 1 Jen k i n s was ca 1 1 e d , and t es t i f i e d t ha t he , B i 11
Jenkins, had left the hereoin there at the Carlson residence one
hour before the search, without appellant's knowledge.

This

testimony came even after Mr. Jenkins had been informed of the
fact that he may have been incriminating himself (T. 160-161) as to
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a felony.
The record does not disclose any evidence relating
to appellant's possession.

The only evidence unfavorable to

appellant consists of the circumstantial evidence, the presence
of narcotics in the home.

Where evidence is wholly circumstantial,

and facts and circumstances in evidence are of such a character
as to fairly permit inference consistent with innocence, it
cannot be regarded as evidence sufficient to support conviction.
Jackson v. State, 403 P.

2d 518,

(Okla. 1965).

This court has held that where the only evidence
pointing to guilt is circumstantial:
.in order to warrant a conviction
the evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than the defendant's
guilt." State v. John, 586 P. 2d 410,411
(Utah 1978), and cases cited therein, at
Note 2.
As to the evidence with respect to possession of
heroin by the appellant, the test espoused in John is not
met.

The testimony of Mr. Jenkins, given voluntarily, despite

the possibility of his being prosecuted for a felony, raised
a reasonable and undisputed hypothesis pointing to appellant's
innocence.

It should also be noted that Mr. Jenkins came

forward with this information both to appellant and appellant's
counsel, as soon as he learned of appellant's arrest (See
defendant's exhibits 31D and 32D).

The instant case being

wholly circumstantial, the evidence is insufficient to support
the convictions and this Court should reverse the convictions.
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CONCLUSION
In the instant case, appellant was convicted on
the basis of circumstantial evidence.

Critical items of

evidence were introduced at trial, over objection after the
exclusionary rule was clearly violated.

The conference between

Mr. Campbell and the officer-witnesses concerned the chain of
custody problems, which were vigorously disputed by defense
counsel.

Later the items were linked up and admitted, thereby

prejudicing the appellant.
The State did not prove possession, a necessary elemen·
I
No evidence I
for the er ime charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.
was offered to show appellant's dominion or control over the
itmes of contraband.
the convictions.

There is insufficient evidence to support

For these reasons the Court should reverse

convictions.
Respectfully submitted,
MARK A. BESENDORFER
Lawyer for Appellant
D. GILBERT ATHAY
Lawyer for Appellant
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